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SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

* * * * * * *
MILLER PONTIAC, INC.,
a Utah corporation, d/b/a
LAURY MILLER PONTIAC,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent, )
vs.
JANET S. OSBORNE,

,

Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Case No. 16847

* * * * * * *
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action regarding a breach of contract.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After the trial court overruled the motion of counsel
for appellant for a continuance based upon the appellant's absence and lack of knowledge of the trial,

h~

heard the case and

'

determined that the appellant breached her contract with the
respondent.

The trial court then refused to modify the judgment

or award a new trial when advised of both his erroneous rulings
and the failure of respondent to comply with the law regarding
resale after repossession.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks in the alternative either judgment in
her favor that respondent breached the contract with appellant or

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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breached its statutory duties to appellant and is thus not entitled to relief from appellant or reversal of the judgment of
the trial court and remand of the case for a fair re-trial.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
The parties entered into a contract whereby the plaintiff sold the defendant an automobile.

A contract was signed on

March 20, 1978 and a second on or about April 10, 1978.
105-106, 126, 129-130)

(R. 2,

Shortly after the signing of the second

contract, the car ceased operating and was returned by the
appellant to the respondent.

(Ro

133, 214-215)

Thereafter, the

appellant refused to pay for the car so respondent repaired it,
resold it (without notice to the appellant) and instituted the
instant action against appellant for damages in the amount of
$14,287.04 plus interest and attorneys fees.

{R. 2-4).

The appellant purchased the automobile for her son,
Don.
217).

He drove it for three weeks and it ceased to operate (R.
Don testified that sometimes, because of the power of the

car and injuries he had suffered, the car would "patch out", that
is the clutch would pop out so fast that the rear wheels would
spin before the car could go into an even starting motion (R.
207, 217) but both he and two of his friends, who frequently
drove with him during the three weeks that he had the automobile
in his possession testified that he drove it carefully and considerately.

(R. 197-198, 200-201, 204, 207, 208, 209)

Despite

this caution and care, the car ceased to operate three weeks
after its purchase.

(R. 217)
-2-
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Don Osborne testified that a few days before the car
ceased to function, he heard unusual noises and took the car in
for servicing.

Although he left it all day at Laury Miller's,

the service department did nothing with the car.
212)

(R. 207, 211-

Since he intended to take the car on a trip to Bear Lake

and was worried about the noises, he asked if it would be all
right to do so without their having performed service upon it and
was informed that this could be done.

(R. 207, 209, 210, 211-

212) .
After receiving this reassurance, Mr. Osborne took the
car on the trip.

When the noise became worse, he pulled into a

gas station at Park City, Utah for service.
oil and four quarts were added.

(R. 213)

The car was low on
When he returned to

Salt Lake City, the car simply stopped running and smoke began
pouring from it.

(R. 214).

Thereafter, Mr. Osborne called Laury

Miller and told them to take the car back.

(R. 214).

Mr. Osborne

informed respondent to keep the car if they would not put a new
engine in it; respondent informed him that he should pay for
repairs and keep the car.

(R. 218-129).

The mechanic who repaired the car for respondent
testified that he felt that the car had been run at excessive
RPM, had suffered excessive clutch and rear tire wear, found the
car to be full of oil and did not find damage consistent with the
testimony of Mr. Osborne that he had to add the four quarts of
oil.

(R. 270-175).
-3-
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The automobile, after repair, was resold at a profit by
respondent to another purchaser without notice to appellant.

(R.

68-69, 162)
Trial of this case was repeatedly reset by the court
before it ultimately came to trial.

The clerk of Salt Lake

County originally set this matter for trial on March 28, 1979, by
a notice mailed July 26, 1978.

(R. 12)

A pre-trial settlement

conference was thereafter held on March 8, 1979, (R. 20) and the
trial date of March 28, 1979, was confirmed.

(R. 21)

On March

23, 1979, the clerk's office, based on the fact that no judge
would be available to hear the case, continued the trial to May
24, 1979.

(R. 22)

Thereafter, on May 24, 1979, for the conveni-

ence of the court, the trial was continued until June 13, 1979,
(R. 48)

On May 25, 1979, the trial was reset for June 11, 1979,

(R. 49) and upon agreement of counsel for the respective parties
on May 30, 1979, an amended notice of continuance was sent out
confirming the trial date of June 11, 1979.

(R. 50)

On June 11, 1979, counsel for the appellant appeared
before the court and requested a continuance based on the fact
that his client was not present and since he had not been able to
confirm with his client that the trial would be on June 11, 1979,
stated he did not know if she knew it would be held.

He stated

he felt that her case was prejudiced by going to trial without
her.

(R. 52, 92)

This motion was denied by the trial court who

compelled counsel for the appellant to go forward in her absence.
(R. 52-53, 92-93)
-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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After trial, counsel for appellant discussed the trial
with appellant and learned that no notice of the resale or intent
to resell the automobile was ever sent by respondent to appellant.
After judgment was entered against appellant, the trial court was
informed of this (R. 68-69).

In oral argument of the motion for

new trial or to amend judgment, counsel for the respondent admitted no evidence of compliance with Section 70A-9-504 Utah Code
Annotated 1953, could be found but asserted that this was not
timely raised.

The trial court overruled the appellant's motions

(R. 77, 78) and this appeal was taken (R. 80).
ARGUMENTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING
A CONTINUANCE TO APPELLANT AND REQUIRING APPELLANT'S
COUNSEL TO GO TO TRIAL WHEN APPELLANT WAS NOT AVAILABLE
TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PROCEEDINGS, DID NOT HAVE NOTICE
OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND THERE WAS NO PREJUDICE TO RESPONDENT WHICH WOULD HAVE RESULTED FROM A CONTINUANCE.
This court has declared that:
"
• it is in accord with the most fundamental
traditions of our legal system that a party should
be afforded every reasonable opportunity to be in
attendance at his trial. Jaffe v. Lilienthal, 101
Cal. 175, 35 P. 636; cf. Westfall v. Motors Ins.
Corp., 36 Mont. 449, 348 P.2d 784 (1960) ."
Bairas v. Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 273, 373 P.2d 375 (1972).

This

rule was rejected by the trial court in the instant matter when
-5-
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appellant's counsel was forced to go to trial in her absence.
This abuse is pronounced in this case as the matter was repeatedly
reset for trial by the court, not either of the parties.

When the

trial date was finally set and held, counsel was unable to confirm
the reset trial date with his client between May 30, 1979 and
June 11, 1979.

As a result, despite intense efforts both by her

son and her attorney to reach her she was not available for trial.*
The respondent was ready for trial on June 11, 1979 but
asserted no prejudice to the court if the trial were continued.
Respondent's counsel simply asserted that he was present with his
witnesses and desired to proceed.

Despite all these factors the

trial court required counsel for appellant to proceed in her
absence.
In Bairas v. Johnson, supra, as in the instant matter,
a motion for continuance was overruled by the trial court and a
party was required to go to trial because the deposition of that
party was available for use by the court.

This Court noted

regarding such a procedure that:
" . . . the superiority of oral testimony to that
taken by deposition is apparent, and resort to
deposition to introduce a party's testimony of
trial should be done only when the circumstances
will not reasonably allow a desirous party to
appear in his own behalf." 13 Utah 2d at 273;
373 P.2d at

*Appellant was in Texas and all efforts to inform her of
the trial before it started failed.
-6-
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The appellant's testimony was vital to her case.

Counsel for the

appellant did not learn that two contracts between the parties had
been signed as far apart ·as March 20th and April 10th until the
course of the trial.

(R. 181)

Nor did counsel for appellant

learn that there had been no notice of the resale of the automobile by respondent until after the trial had been completed.
(R. 68-69)

This was in part a result of settlement negotiations

between the parties which were initiated immediately after the
depositions of the parties and te:pninated slightly before the
trial but it was also a result of an inability of counsel for
appellant to work with her over the discovered documents before
trial.

In addition, testimony regarding face-to-face negotiations

between appellant and Jim Hayes, Ken Christofferson and Jeff Tebbs
could not be presented.

Finally, a defense which could well be

decisive in this matter was not discovered until after trial.
Thus, as noted by this Court in Bairas v. Johnson, 13 Utah 2d at
273, the impact on appellant's position of her non-attendance was
crucial.
This is underlined by the fact that the continuance was
requested not because appellant had determined not to come to
court or had taken evasive or diliatory action or ignored the
matter but simply did not know that the case had been set for
trial.

The repeated continuances in this case had resulted from

the action of the court, not from either party and appellant could

-7-
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not be reached by her counsel after the May 30th confirmation of
the trial setting by counsel and the court.
This was not discovered until a few days before trial
and once counsel for appellant learned of the problem he informed
counsel for respondent that he was having trouble locating his
client and might have to make a continuance request if he could
not reach her.

This was confirmed immediately before going to

trial when counsel for appellant had definitely determined neither
he nor the appellant's son had been able to reach the appellant to
inform her that the trial was going to occur.
As much notice as could reasonably be prepared and
transmitted was effected.

Under such circumstances this court has

held that:
Whatever the rule might be when counsel have
ample time within which to make a motion for
continuance, when counsel are taken by surprise,
as in this case, so that they do not have five
days in which to serve the motion, they are not
precluded from making the motion." 13 Utah 2d at
274.
11

In this case, counsel for the appellant learned only a few days
before the trial that appellant might not know about the trial.
He notified counsel for respondent of the problem and tried both
personally and through appellant's son, Don Osborne, to inform her
of the trial but was unable to do so.

Consequently, the notice

contemplated under Rule 40(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
could not be provided. However, under that rule as construed by
-8-
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the Utah Supreme Court in Bairas v. Johnson, supra, proper and
adequate notice for the motion for continuance was presented.
Finally, it should be noted that no showing of any
unfairness or damage to respondent was asserted when counsel for
appellant made this request for continuance.

The appellant was

not offered the option of paying costs to have the matter continued, Youngren v. John W. Lloyd Construction Co., 22 Utah 2d
207, 450 P.2d 985 (1969), her motion was simply overruled and she,.
to her obvious detriment,
into a trial.

(through her counsel) was forced to go

This abuse of discretion requires this court to

reverse the judgment entered against the appellant and remand the
matter for a new trial.

Bairas v. Johnson, supra.
POINT II

RESPONDENT'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS
OF SECTION 70A-9-501 AND 504, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
(1953) PRECLUDES THE AWARD OF DAMAGES AGAINST APPELLANT.
'This Court has ruled:
"In an action for a deficiency judgment such
as this the secured party has the burden of
establishing that the disposition of the
property was done in a commercially reasonable
manner, and that reasonable notice to the
debtor(s) was given." (Emphasis added)
FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d 803
at 806-07 (Utah 1979).
In this case after appellant returned the car to
respondent, it was resold at a profit (R. 162) but no notice
of the intent to sell or of the sale was ever given to the

-9-
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appellant.

Accordingly, respondent has not met its burden and

was not entitled to the deficiency judgment which is in reality
the judgment entered by the trial court against appellant.

In

this case as in FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d
at 807-08, no notice was given of the resale and no deficiency
judgment should have been granted to respondent.
After the trial, when appellant discussed the matter
with her counsel, she advised her counsel for the first time
that she had never received notice of this resale or even
notice that respondent intended to resell the car.

Counsel for

appellant raised this with the trial court as a part of appellant's motion pursuant to Rules 59 and 60 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure (R. 68-69) •

Even though counsel for respondent

admitted in oral argument on these motions that no such notice
was transmitted to appellant, the trial court overruled appellant's motions (Ro 77, 78).

In making this ruling the trial

court erred as respondent's invocation of Section 70-A-9-501
and 504 Utah Code Annotated 1953 required the trial court to
deny the respondent any recovery on its complaint once it was
established that appellant had ,no notice of the sale.
Counsel for respondent asserted that the appellant's
failure to raise this defense before trial precluded court
consideration of this defense.

Counsel for appellant responded

that it had been raised in a timely fashion due to the fact
-10-
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that the trial court had overruled a motion for continuance and
compelled counsel for the appellant to go to trial when she was
not present and that the matter was now being raised before the
judgment had become final and appealable.

Nonetheless, the

trial court overruled these objections (R. 77-78) and this
appeal followed.
Utah law is very clear that where the're is a failure
to comply with the provisions of Section 70A-9-504(3) Utah Code
Annotated 1953, through a failure to provide notice of the
proposed sale it precludes a deficiency judgment against the
debtor.

FMA Financial Corporation v. Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d

803 (Utah 1979); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Burns, 562 P.2d 233
(Utah 1977).

In the instant action, there is no question that

the car over which this action has been maintained was resold
by respondent after repossession and that the resale produced a

profit to respondent.

(R. 157, 158-159, 162, 166).

Thus the

trial court erred in overruling the appellant's motions and
should either have modified the judgment or set it aside and
directed a re-trial of this matter.
While respondent asserts that the failure of appellant
to properly raise this in the pleadings prevents consideration
of the issue, appellant asserts that she did raise it in as
timely a fashion as she could in the face of the actions of
the trial court.

This is not a situation like that considered
-11-
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by this court in Zions First National Bank v. Hurst, 570 P.2d
1031 (Utah 1977}, where the obligation so far exceeded the debt
that notice of the sale would have been of no effect nor produced any injustice.

Nor is it like the case of American State

Insurance Company v. Miller, Adams and Crawford, 557 P.2d 756
(Utah 1976} where the issue of the failure to comply with
Section 70A-9-504 Utah Code Annotated 1953 was raised for the
first time on appeal.

The defense in the instant action was

raised to the trial court, admitted by the respondent and
improperly rejected by the trial court before the judgment
became final.

This rejection of clear legal principle by the

trial court requires this court to reverse the judgment of the
trial court and either enter judgment in favor of appellant or
remand for trial on the question of compliance with the provisions of Section 70A-9-501 and 504, Utah Code Annotated 1953.
POINT III
RESPONDENT WAS AWARDED EXCESSIVE DAMAGES TO WHICH
IT WAS NOT ENTITLED.
It is Horbook Blackletter Law that:
"To recover substantial damages for a given
claim of loss or damage, the plaintiff has
the burden of proving such loss or damage
did in fact result, and that it was caused
by defendant's wrongdoing". Handbook on
the Law of Damages, Charles T. McCormick,
West Pub. Co. 1935, P. 53,
or as the rule was stated by this court:
-12-
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"One is liable only for the actual damage his
acts provoke." Thompson v. Jacobson, 23 Utah
2d 359, 360, 463 P.2d 801 (1970).
This principle was rejected by the trial court in the judgment
entered against appellant and this court must correct that error.
The trial court itemized the damages awarded by minute
entry on August_6, 1979 (R. 57) and they were incorporated in the
final judgment of the court.

(R. 145-148)

appellant to these awards were overruled.

The objections of the

·(R. 77-78)

In these

rulings, the court made several obvious errors that are inconsistent with the evidence presented by respondent.
The first and foremost error is that when the car was
resold at a prof it, it was clear respondent suffered no damage
and the complaint should have been dismissed.
allowed Laury Miller to recover everything to

The court's action
whi~h

it might have

been entitled by the resale and yet awarded a double recovery by
entering a judgment for unsustained damages as the prof it earned
on the resale exceeded the cost of the car and repairs and all
other elements of claimed damages.

(R. 26, 157-159, 162, 166)

In addition, damages for specific items which the
record demonstrated were not suffered.
The trial court awarded to the plaintiff lost profit in
the sum of $829.00.

(R. 57, 148-149)

However, the record

clearly revealed that the automobile was resold at a profit.
257, 158-159, 162, 166)

(R.

In awarding the respondent lost profits
-13-
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when they had not been lost, the trial court erred.
The court awarded damges entitled "expense of processing" in the sum of $100. 00.

(R. 57, 67)

In doing so, the

court erred as the testimony clearly related that this $100.00
was recovered when the automobile was resold after repair.

(R.

167)
The trial court awarded conunissions in the sum of
$392.01.

{R. 57, 67)

This was in error.

$88.00 of the $392.01

was never paid by respondent and that sum, having been recovered
on resale, was never lost.

(R. 167)

Profit from the service contract in the sum of $260.00
was also awarded by the trial court.

(R. 57, 67)

The testimony

was that only 35% of this would have been lost had the second
purchaser not taken a service contract.

(R. 146-147)

Finally, the court awarded $1,018.56 for the repairs
respondent made to the automobile (R. 57, 67) despite the fact
that the testimony revealed that the cost of those repairs to
Laury Miller was only $778.91.

{R. 145)

In sum, the trial court awarded, assuming that the
respondent was entitled to damages, $239.65 for the cost of
repairs, $169.00 for profit from the service contract, $88.01 as
lost conunissions, $829.00 as lost profit and $100.00 for the
expense of processing, or $1,425.66 for damages not suffered by
respondent.

In addition, the court awarded $1,512.55 in damages

not suffered as the car was resold at a profit thus recouping
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these costs for respondent.

(R. 26, 157-59, 162, 166).

This

error must be corrected by this court.
POINT IV
APPELLANT PROPERLY REVOKED HER ACCEPTANCE UNDER
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 70A-2-608 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
1953, OR RESCINDED THE CONTRACT.
Utah law clearly allows a purchaser such as appellant,
of goods which have a defect which is not discovered at the
time of sale to either revoke her acceptance or rescind the
contract.

The Legislature has enacted a provision governing

the revocation of acceptance:
Section 70A-2-608 Utah Code Annotated states:
Revocation of acceptance in whole or in part.
--(1)
The buyer may revoke his acceptance of
a lot or commercial unit whose nonconformity
substantially impairs its value to him if he
has accepted it
(a) on the reasonable assumption that
its nonconformity would be cured and it has
not been seasonably cured; or
(b) without discovery of such nonconformity if his acceptance was reasonably
induced either by the difficulty or discovery
before acceptance or by the seller's assurances.
(2)
Revocation of acceptance must occur
within a reasonable time after the buyer
discovers or should have discovered the
ground for it and before any substantial
change in condition of the goods which is not
caused by their own defects.
It is not
effective until the buyer notified the
seller of it.

-15-
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(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same
rights and duties with regard to the goods
involved as if he had rejected them.
This court enunciated the applicable standards for
rescission:
Traditionally, a person who has been fraudulently induced to enter into a contract has
either of two remedies; he could rescind the
transaction--tendering back what he has
received and suing for what he has parted
with; or, he may affirm the transaction and
maintain an action in deceit. The Uniform
Commercial Code makes damages available in an
action for rescission, but it does not
otherwise change the traditional theory of
election of remedies.
11

In this case, Buyers' conduct is not consistent with affirmation of the transaction.
They stopped making payments under the
Agreement, and they permitted the home to be
repossessed and sold without objection.
Their conduct is only consistent with rescission. Mecham v. Benson, 590 P.2d 304
(1979).

Approximately three weeks after purchasing the automobile for which this action is maintained, it ceased to operate.
Don Osborne, the person who primarily drove the automobile and
two witnesses who had driven with him repeatedly throughout the
three weeks that he had possessed the car, stated that he drove
it carefully, considerately, did not abuse it and paid careful
attention to its maintenance.

(R. 197-198, 200-201, 204, 208)

While there was no question that the car.suffered extensive
damages and required extensive repair, (R. 170-172)

the mechanic

who repaired the automobile, Mr. Glen Olsen, testified the damage
-16-
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~~

~as·inconsistent

with the problem that Mr. Osborne described.

Mr. Osborne stated that the car made unusual sounds (R. 209) but
agents of respondent said there was no problem and it was all
right to take the car to Evanston (R 207, 210, 211-12).

On the

trip the car used a large quantity of oil (R. 171-174, 213).
Since the damages suffered by the car were not caused
by Mr. Osborne, there was apparently some other defect in the car
which caused its demise so soon after being purchased.

Under

these circumstances, that defect justified the action of the
appellant in informing the respondent that either the engine
would have to be replaced or they must take the automobile back,
(R. 218-219), that is, that she was withdrawing her acceptance of
the defective merchandise under Section 70A-2-608 Utah Code
Annotated 1953, or rescinding the transaction.
The position and action of the appellant is entirely
consistent with the decision of this court in Mecham v. Benson,
590 P.2d 304 (1979).

As in that case, the buyer's conduct was

consistent with rescission.

When a major defect in the auto-

mobile was discovered shortly after purchase (three weeks),
appellant returned it to the seller and allowed seller to do as
they wished with the car.

Seller took possession and resold the

car without providing notice of the sale to appellant.

This

action was in fact an acceptance of a rescision by the respondent.
Under these facts, that is, a major mechanical failure occurring
-17-
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within three weeks of purchase justify fully the revocation of
acceptance which occurred immediately upon discovering a defect
which "substantially impaired" the value of the car to the
appellant, Section 70A-2-608 Utah Code Annotated 1953, or rescission of the contract by the appellant.

The trial court erred

in failing to rule accordingly.
This is particularly true where within three weeks of
purchase, the automobile suffers such extensive damage despite
the careful care given it by its driver.

Such an automobile

cannot possibly have been either merchantable or fit for the
purpose for which it was intended and therefore the sale of such
merchandise combined with the refusal of respondent to remedy the
defects reveals a clear violation of the provisions of Section
70A-2-314, Utah Code Annotated 1953.

When respondents refused to

repair said automobile, they violated their warranty duties under
this statute and if, as they have asserted, they modified in the
purchase contract, the warranties required of them by Section
70A-2-314, Utah Code Annotated 1953, their position cannot be
upheld.
Under the provisions of Section 70A-3-316 Utah Code
Annotated 1953 and the provisions of the Magnuson-Moss warranty
Act, codified as 15 United States Code, Sections 2301, et seq.,
the respondent is prohibited from revoking or disclaiming this
warranty.

Section 2304(a) of Title 15 United States Code pro-

vides that:
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"In order for a warrantor warranteeing a consumer product by means of a written warranty to
meet the federal minimum standards for warranty-(!) such warrantor has a minimum remedy such
consumer product within a rea'sonable time and
without charge, in the case of a defect, malfunction, or failure to conform with such written warranty;"
the statute goes on to provide in Sub-section (d):
"for purposes of this section and of Section
2302(c) of this title, the term "without charge"
means that the warrantor may not assess the
consumer for any costs the warrantor or his
representatives incur in connection with the
required remedy of a warranteed consumer product".
Section 2308(a) of Title 15 declares:
"No supplier may disclaim or modify (except as
provided in sub-section (b) of this section) any
implied warranty to a consumer with respect to
such consumer product if (1) such supplier makes
any written warranty to the consumer with respect
to such consumer product, or (2) at the time of
sale, or within 90 days thereafter, such supplier
enters into a service contract with the consumer
which applies to such consumer product."
The exception clause (b) provides:
"For purposes of this chapter (other than Section
2304(a) (2) of this title), implied warranties may
be limited in duration to the duration of a written
warranty of reasonable duration, if such limitation
is conscienable and is set forth in clear unmistakable language and prominently displayed on the
face of the warranty."
Sub-section (c) of Section 2308 of Title 15 United States Code
then declares:

"A disclaimer, modification, or limitation made in

violation of this Section shall be ineffective for purposes of
this Chapter and State law."

Under these provisions, it is clear

that if the respondent makes any claim that there was no implied
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warranty of fitness and merchantability as required by Section
70A-2-314 Utah Code Annotated 1953, the Magnuson-Moss Act pro-

visions render that disclaimer invalid.
In the instant matter the car suffered totally disabling
damage within three weeks of purchase.

Prior to suffering that

damage, the driver of the automobile, Don Osborne, brought it in
to the service department of the defendant, stated it was making
unusual noises· which should be checked, (R. 155) left it with
respondent's service department all day and was informed (after
learning no service had been performed) that in the opinion of the
service people who had listened for the noise, it would be safe to
take the car on a trip to Bear Lake.

(R. 207-212)

While the car

drove with no problems to Evanston, Wyoming, on the way back the
noises began picking up and when Mr. Osborne had it checked in
Park City, the engine required four quarts of oil.

(R. 213)

When

it arrived in Bountiful, it ceased operating altogether. (R. 214)
Since the testimony of. the mechanic who repaired the car
for respondent established that the damages were inconsistent with
the description given by Mr. Osborne, there was some type of
defect in the car which by law were included within the warranties
established by law and which could not be waived.

Since the

respondent has refused to honor the warranties imposed upon it by
law and insisted that the appellant pay for any repairs done, (R.
218-219) the warranties have been disclaimed and the action of the
-20-
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appellant in revoking her acceptance of defective goods, Section
70A-2-608 Utah Code Annotated 1953, or rescinding the contract,
Mecham v. Benson, supra, is appropriate.

The trial court erred in

not permitting appellant to invoke either of these doctrines and
voiding the contract between the parties.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES
TO THE RESPONDENT.
Appellant believed that the respondent had breached its
contract by refusing to honor its warranty and by insisting that
appellant pay for repairs that were properly the responsibility
of the respondent.

In addition, respondent did not comply with

the provisions of Section 70A-9-504 Utah Code Annotated in disposing of the automobile which was the subject of the contract
between the parties.

Under the decisions of this Court in

Fulmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d 606 (Utah 1976); Fireman's Insurance v.
Brown, 529 P.2d 419 (Utah 1974) and Amos v. Bennion, 18 Utah 2d
251, 420 P.2d 47 (1966) the trial court erred in awarding respondent attorney's fees.
There is no question that the contract between the
parties provided for an award of attorney's fees if there was a
breach of the contract.

However, as this court ruled in Fulmer v.

Blood, supra, where the appellant had justification for making
her claims and taking the action that she took, the trial court
appropriately could refuse to award attorney's fees.

546 P.2d
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610.

Acord Fireman's Insurance v. Brown, supra, Amos v. Bennion.

In the instant case, the trial court abused its discretion when
it awarded attorney's fees in light of the fact that it had
forced counsel for the appellant to go into trial without appellant, had awarded damages to the respondent to which it was not
entitled and refused to allow revocation of acceptance or rescission of the contract when that action was appropriate.
Accordingly, this error should be reversed by this court.
CONCLUSIONS
The trial court erred in requiring counsel for the
appellant to go to trial in her absence.

This error was com-

pounded when the court thereafter rendered judgment against the
appellant for damages to which the respondent was not entitled
because of respondent's failure to comply with requirements of
Section 70A-9-504 Utah Code Annotated 1953, refused to allow the
revocation of acceptance or rescission of the contract between
the parties as was justified by the acts of respondent and
awarded excessive damages to which respondent was not entitled.
This court should correct those errors and either rule as a
matter of law the respondent is not entitled to judgment against
the defendant, reverse the trial court and direct a dismissal of
the plaintiff's complaint, or reverse the judgment of the trial
court and remand this matter for a proper trial between the
-22\
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parties where all issues can be fairly considered by the trial
court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of April, 1980.

~LV~,
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
79 South State Street
P. o. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Telephone:
(801) 532-1234

Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby declare that I caused to be mailed two copies
of the foregoing Brief of Appellant in Case No. 16847, postage
prepaid, this 30th day of April, 1980, to Carmen E. Kipp and
Thomas N. Arnett, Jr., Attorneys for Respondent, at 32 Exchange
Place, Suite 600, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
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